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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology; Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods; J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin; Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie; R. d. Fil.* = *Riviste di Filosofia e Scienze Affini; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftiche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* —Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Zur Entwicklung des Rationalismus von Descartes bis Kant. H. PICHLER. Kantstudien, XVIII, 4, pp. 383–418.

Rationalism has been treated inadequately by historians of philosophy. This is very evident in the common misunderstanding of Kant's relation to rationalism. From Descartes to Kant there was an *élan* of development, which Kant, far from checking, helped upon its way. Descartes contributed to rationalism the criterion of clearness and distinctness of ideas and the method of deduction. His doctrine of rational knowledge was: *nulla scientia nisi per intuitum vel deductionem.* All evidence rests on intuition. The standard of evidence is expressed in the *cogito ergo sum*—an error in reasoning which was both fruitful and disastrous in the Cartesian rationalism. Descartes seemed to prefer to receive the validity of mathematical knowledge from the hands of his fallaciously obtained God rather than to get it at first hand. Spinoza's most essential contribution to the rationalistic philosophy was his deepening of the conception of reason, which became for him a metaphysical principle: *ratio sive causa.* From this it follows that everything is strictly determined. The nature of a thing is determined by its concept or definition. An adequate definition is not only a *causa cognoscendi* but a *causa essendi.* All things follow from the concept of the totality of things, or *Natura naturans.* The Spinozistic concept of God is therefore the law which determines every content; for the *Natura naturans* is no mere logical first cause, but the *Weltwesen* comprehended in the *Weltbegriff.* The concept of adequate knowledge is the final synthesis of Spinozistic rationalism. From his conception of immanent truth there followed much of the Leibnitzian philosophy. The fundamental proposition for Leibniz is that of sufficient reason, which left on his hands the problem: What conditions must be fulfilled if the principle of sufficient reason is to be valid? He found the solution in the concept of genera, the individuals of which must present a *universitas ordinata.* As 'nature makes no leaps', there exists between the individuals of one genus, and also between genera, a regularity of differentiation which assures to each individual a place in the system. This is the law of continuity. How far this concept of rational determinism carried Leibniz is shown by the relation of the principle of reason to the principle of contradiction. For Leibniz, every impossibility contained at least an inner contradiction, and that which was not contradictory was at least possible. Reason existed for Leibniz only where logical necessity existed. Everything that is, therefore, exists by logical necessity, or has a reason. Since the principle of contradiction defines what reason is, these two principles are seen to be inseparable. As Couturat rightly points out, the principle of sufficient reason says nothing except that every true proposition is analytical. Though this means that knowledge from analytic judgments is frequently only problematical, yet we may have analytical principles which are categorical, if we assume that logic contains a creative principle; or, in other words, that logic does not *have* reason, but *is* reason. Leibniz did not regard the principle of reason as a problem in itself, as did Kant. Leibniz ontologized concepts, while Kant, on the other hand, regarded the 'Idea' as anti-metaphysical. Kant, however, did not solve the problem he set for himself, but merely stated a new problem. The results of Meinong and von Husserl have a bearing upon that problem. In conclusion, it must be understood that the essence of rationalism does not consist in the presupposition of reason as an especial source of knowledge; it consists rather in the goal which is established for knowledge.

ALMA R. THORNE.

Les nouveaux courants d'idées dans la sociologie contemporaine. E. DE ROBERTY. Rev. Ph., XXXIX, 1, pp. 1–31.

One of the great movements in the history of thought has been the progressive 'exodus' of the sciences from the domain of religious and metaphysical conceptions. An epoch in this movement was marked by the founding of the science of sociology by A. Comte, but this posited the problem, at least equally important, of transforming philosophy. About 1880, a new school of thinkers, modestly calling themselves the Neo-Positivists, began the reduction of the remaining branches of philosophy—ethics, aesthetics, psychology, and especially logic and the theory of knowledge—to the position of social sciences. The present article treats of the resulting reconstruction of sociology. In France, Durkheim was among the first great sociologists to embrace the neo-positivist doctrine of social ideality and organic solidarity against the mechanical solidarity of the economic school. He seems to go to the opposite extreme, however, of regarding social organization and the forms of collective activity as causal products of the arrangement of mental concepts, whereas neo-positivism regards both as coördinate effects of a common cause, the collective experience or interaction of consciousnesses. In regard to the bio-social theory of mind, the great touchstone of neo-positivism, he wavered at first, but later pronounced definitely for the view of psychology as a concrete science dependent on sociology. He and his school have also embraced the neo-positivistic doctrine of the sociological basis of philosophy. Man is the product of society rather than society of man (as thought Spencer and Tarde), and sociology, even more than psychology, is the supreme 'science of man.' They likewise adopt the ethics of the school, which finds the real problem of the moralist in the construction of a science of customs, as well as others of its characteristic tenets, the 'law of the four factors', the 'law of retardation', etc. Beside the name of Durkheim should be placed that of Lévy-Bruhl. This writer thinks the traditional problem of social psychology must be inverted. The real question is not as to the origin of the social consciousness and its explanation in terms of given individual consciousnesses, but rather is it the consciousness of individuality which must be accounted for on social grounds. Besides these pre-eminent names of French sociology, numerous other able thinkers—Izoulet, Gaston Richard, Lalande, Duprat, etc., share similar views. In America, Baldwin's "Thoughts and Things," especially the second part, "Experimental Logic or Genetic Theory of Thought," is a very important attempt to detach the theory of knowledge from philosophy and transform it into a sociologic discipline. Baldwin finds social community to be the basis of objectivity, and thinks the real badge of certitude is the mark of social manufacture: 'made in society'! So, too, in Germany. The neo-positivist view is virtually identical with the energy-sociology of Ostwald, while Simmel's "Soziologie, Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung" (1908) shows the same influence, though developed much less clearly and consistently. In certain pages, the latter author approaches closely to the neo-positivistic view of social phenomena; but he appears to be quite confused as to the relations of the three groups of sciences, the biological, sociological and psychological. In Italy, too, where the ground was better prepared than in Germany, England or Russia, the neo-positivistic conception of sociological problems has received a sympathetic welcome. Especially notable are the doctrines of the philosophic and sociological school of Robert Ardigo, whose theory of justice shows this influence very decidedly.

F. H. KNIGHT.

Idealism and the Reality of Time. BERNARD BOSANQUET. Mind, 89, pp. 91–95.

Time appears as real. All appearance is a partial reality. Therefore, time is a reality though not ultimate. It is as real as the finite world. Time is the process of finite things, and, therefore, it can not be ultimate as a character of the infinite universe. Space and time are the two great shapes of externality which we find transformed in various degrees upwards from the very first stratum in which it becomes compatible with experience. We partly understand time and space, but we are partly in them, and so far as we are in them we do not understand them. When we say that the self differs from a natural object by carrying its past with it in an intelligent form, we are in the true sense including, by transforming, externality. In full reality there is no mere past, mere present, or mere future; every event lives throughout the whole. We thus leave Time behind.

HENRY BENTSON.

L'innéisme des fondements mathématiques. LOUIS DE CONTENSON. Rev. de Ph., XIV, 2, pp. 169–193.

This is the second of three articles on the 'apriorité' of mathematics. In the first article, a criticism of Kant from a philosophical point of view, the writer found the Kantian theory of mathematics seriously at fault. The present article, a criticism of Kant from the standpoint of mathematics, corroborates the conclusions of the first. Assuming the apodictic certainty of mathematics, Kant seeks to justify this certainty by grounding mathematics on the a priori forms of intuition: space and time. But space and time are objective, a posteriori, and imposed on the mind from without. Therefore, to base mathematics on space and time is to make it an empirical science and divest it of its absolute certainty. Moreover, an a priori origin of anything is no guarantee of its certainty, for supposed a priori truths are as difficult to verify as others. But mathematics does not rest on certain judgments of a priori origin. The fundamental principles of mathematics are not judgments, not synthetic, and not a priori; they are hypotheses, conventions, symbols cataloguing different systems of magnitudes. Such propositions as: "space can have only three dimensions," "some symmetrical figures are not superposable," and "three straight lines in the same plane form a triangle," cited by Kant as fundamental principles of mathematics, are not judgments, not synthetic, and not a priori. And far from being apodictically certain and of complete generality, as Kant supposed, they have been shown to be false, relative, or of limited application. They are true for the Euclidian geometry alone, the only geometry that Kant knew, on the supposition that mathematics is an empirical science, and not the work of pure reason unaided by experience. Kant's principles hold true of our three dimensional world, in which they are observed facts; but in the realm of pure reason, where *n*th dimensional worlds are as real as a three dimensional world, they are meaningless. Their opposites are equally true and are employed by the newer mathematics in dealing with *n*th dimensional spaces. Mathematical principles, however, do possess a certainty, the origin and nature of which will be discussed in the last article of this series.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

L'innéisme des fondements mathématiques. LOUIS DE CONTENSON. Rev. de Ph., XIV, 3, pp. 288–309.

This is the last of three articles on the 'apriorité' of mathematics. The apodictic certainty of mathematics is not dependent on an a priori origin of its subject matter, magnitude. The notion of magnitude is of empirical origin, the result of observing external and internal objects, or perhaps succession in time or plurality in space. Magnitude exists in a variety of forms or systems relative to one another, and the nature of the system in which we live is an empirical problem to be solved by experience alone. Moreover, the 'theory of transformation', by which we pass from one system of magnitudes to another, reveals the fact that the origin of the notion of magnitude exerts no determining influence on either the development or certainty of mathematics. Mathematics does not rest on a groundwork of certain judgments of a priori origin. The question whether mathematics has a 'certain' basis is unmeaning, for mathematics has no basis at all. The sole principle taken absolutely for granted is that of all reasoning or discourse, the principle of contradiction. Two judgments, contradictory if admitted simultaneously, may be admitted successively without contradiction, but any principle contradictory in its successive consequences must be rejected. The certainty of mathematics is due to the nature of its subject matter and of its method of procedure. Mathematics is a deduction of attributes from elements by judgments exclusively analytic. It affirms that if such elements have such attributes, there exists between them such relations. Hence, its conclusions are relative to premises and have a certainty proportional to that of the premises. Yet the conclusions are necessary, because no opposite judgments can be proposed to render them false, or doubtful, for the premises have been stated in all possible forms. Furthermore, the validity of the premises cannot be called in question, because they are not to be regarded from an absolute point of view. Though true when stated, they yield immediately to inverse judgments, when the latter are stated. Mathematical principles have only the validity we wish to attribute to them with reference to the system of magnitudes under consideration; but this validity we can make as great as we please. Mathematical principles are neither a priori syntheses nor empirical facts; they are conventions or labels for cataloguing various systems of magnitudes, some applicable to all, some to only one system. But experience alone can enable us to choose from all possible conventions those applicable to our own world.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

On the Nature of Acquaintance. BERTRAND RUSSELL. The Monist, Vol. XXIV, 1, pp. 1–16.

This article is introductory to a series of articles which will advocate a kind of an analysis of the simplest and most pervading aspect of experience, namely acquaintance. It is a preliminary survey of the data of experience. Faint and peripheral sensations are included in experience. Attention is not a prerequisite for experience, for attention is a selection among objects that are 'before the mind' and, therefore, presupposes a larger field. Some facts—those which we see for ourselves—are included in our present experience. We now experience past things which we remember, for the remembering refers to something known to be in the past, a definite experience in the past, and not to the image which we call up now. We know that the group of things now experienced is not all-embracing, partly because of our belief in a future, partly from the knowledge of the fact that we have forgotten something, and partly from the region of abstract mathematics and logical possibility. We regard our present and past experiences as all parts of one experience, of 'our' experience, through memory of a certain kind. The memory which prolongs our personality backwards in time is the memory of our experiencing, not merely of the things which we experienced. We believe that 'our' total experience is not all-embracing because; (*a*) there is no logical reason against it, (*b*) in the logical world there certainly are facts which we do not experience, (*c*) the common sense assumption, that there are particulars which we do not experience, has been found thoroughly successful as a working hypothesis.

HENRY BENTSON.

Zur Geschichte der Skepsis. I. Franciscus Sanchez. DR. A. CORALNIK. Ar. f. G. Ph., XX, 2, pp. 188–222.

Scepticism is not a doctrine, it is a thought genus, of which there are two species, the scientific, and the ethical-psychological. Franciscus Sanchez is a typical representative of the older scientific scepticism. Primarily he was a physician, and most of his writings are medical; but he also published a "Tractatus Philosophicus. Quod nihil scitur." The question as to whether knowledge is possible is left open; he is only concerned to prove that we know nothing, to the end that the yoke of Aristotelian logic may be thrown off. In eloquent language, he begins with the story of his dissatisfaction with past and present philosophical systems; and while he concludes with a conviction of the impossibility of laying hold upon certain truth, he asserts an untiring purpose to follow after nature by means of hypotheses, although time prove one after the other inadequate. The heart of his scepticism is the unknowability of the thing in itself. For the most part his discussion is a criticism of language in mockery of the scholastic worship of words and definitions. The endless regress of definition, the infinite richness of reality, the inability to image ultimate notions, give the grounds for his assertion that we know nothing. His criticism of the faculty of reason is based upon the propositions, that all knowledge is an organization of sense data, and that these data are untrustworthy. After these proofs that we know nothing, the third part of his treatise, which shows that nothing can be completely known, seems quite superfluous. Here his interest is chiefly theological. He desires to show that as finite creatures we can have no clear and distinct idea of the Creator. The flaw in his argument is his conception of the nature of science. He is not content with the systematization of experience, with truth valid within experience, but insists that we know nothing, since we do not grasp the thing in itself. Yet on the whole, his maintenance of a critical rather than a dogmatic attitude, the insistence on the wherefore with which he concludes, performed a real service in the development of philosophy.

ANITA FREDERICA DE LAGUNA.

Psychology as a Science of Behavior. B. H. BODE. The Psychological Review, XXI, no. 1, pp. 46–61.

The definition that psychology is concerned with 'the description and explanation of states of consciousness', is falling into disrepute. The assumptions involved in this definition still persist. Professor Watson, however, states that all that is significant in psychology is retained if the study is changed from introspection to behavior. According to Professor Angell the study of behavior is inadequate because of the inability to trace out the behavior without appeal to mental processes, and because mental processes are worthy objects of study. This latter position assumes that introspection yields 'purely subjective facts', and for that reason a strict behaviorist could not use them. Does introspection yield subjective facts? The keen eyed scientist might as well be treated as gathering subjective facts as the psychologist. The psychologist and the scientist use the same mode of approach, but it is assumed that their respective subject matters are different. According to Professor Titchener, psychology is concerned with experience in its aspect of dependence upon the body. This word dependence is ambiguous, so that consciousness is treated sometimes in terms of behavior, and at other times in terms of mental states. When dependence is used in this latter sense we have the old distinction and its accompanying problems of primary and secondary qualities. The behaviorist must differentiate the behavior as subject matter for psychology from other forms of behavior. The behaviorist is interested in the movements resulting from the stimulus only in so far as they constitute response. Psychology thus is a study of certain causal relationships. These causal relationships are concerned with a unique kind of relation between stimulus and response. The response is one which seeks and maintains the stimulus necessary for further response. The characteristic trait of conscious behavior, the subject matter of psychology, is that stimulus and response develop concomitantly. The distinctive trait of introspection is not its method or its subject matter, but its problem. The purpose of introspection is to discover the physical and physiological conditions of experience.

C. M. HOBART.

Hasard et Déterminisme. A. DARBON. Rev. Phil., XXXIX, 3, pp. 225–265.

The events which we attribute to chance have this singular character, that individually they cannot be predicted, but taken in mass their distribution may be accurately calculated in advance. A 'law of chance' seems at first glance a contradiction in terms, as chance is conceived as the negation of law. Yet predictions based on the 'law of large numbers' hold good in practice and the law must in some sense be valid. The calculation of probabilities originated in a question put to Pascal in connection with a game involving chance, and it was with such questions that early investigators—Bernouilli, Huygens, Montmart, Laplace, D'Alembert, etc.—principally dealt. But the application in recent times to social phenomena, vital statistics, crime, etc., has broadened the problem while adding interest to it. Practical results seem to necessitate the admission of the validity of the concept of chance, in the sense that two events may be in reality equally probable (or in any other ratio). The problem which has puzzled those who have worked with laws of chance and attempted to derive them logically is, how to reconcile such a concept with universal causal determination, in which as scientists they have put implicit faith. Laplace thought the distribution of events according to probability might be explained by supposing the idea traceable in part to our knowledge (of behavior *en masse*) and in part to our ignorance (of the determining causes of individual instances). Two sets of causes are thus thought of as operating; one group are permanent and known and the other variable and unknown, while the former tend to preponderate over the latter in proportion to the number of instances considered. More recently Poisson, Cournot, H. Poincaré, LeDantec and others have grappled with the problem, but no one has been able to reconcile the notions of an event as really fortuitous and yet rigidly determined. It may be taken as established that there is no way out of the following dilemma: Either the theory of probabilities is an illusion, or else such a thing as contingency has a place in the world. A systematic treatment of chance thus conceived must take it up under two forms. The first of these is causal determination itself. For causes cannot furnish any final explanation of an event or give it a character of true necessity. Causal explanation is at best hypothetical: *if* the cause, then the effect; the cause must be assumed as *given*. Hence there is no reason at last why the event is as it is, and it would certainly have been different if previous events had been other than they were. The second form of contingency appears in the reasoned acts of sentient beings, in so far as they err in achieving their end through imperfect psycho-physical co-ordination. Examples are the distribution of shots in target-shooting, errors in reading scientific instruments, etc. A graver case is that of the divided will itself, hesitating between two ends. It is merely a verbal solution of the problem of choice to say that the stronger motive must win out, since we have no possible way of knowing which is the stronger (as in the case of mechanical forces) and simply arbitrarily call that one stronger which does finally control action. Such contingency is obviously an imperfection, and it is crudely inconsistent to make it the basis of responsibility in ethics and of certitude in epistemology. Still, it prepares the way for liberty by interrupting the blind, fortuitous succession of perceptions and reactions and calling the personality into play. Liberty is properly defined as completely motivated action, and must be regarded as a victory over contingency, not as contingency itself.

F. H. KNIGHT.

Des bases méthodologiques de la géographie humaine. PHILIPPE CHAMPAULT. Rev. de Ph., XIV, 2, pp. 113–136.

In the study of the relation of the earth to man the older geography was purely descriptive, while the newer geography seeks to be explicative and calls itself 'la géographie humaine' or 'l'Anthropogéographie.' Élisée Reclus represents the older tendency and Jean Brunhes, the newer. Reclus merely describes the modifications of the earth's surface due to man, while Brunhes attempts to connect causes with effects and to formulate laws. For Reclus 'la géographie humaine' is the study of " the modalities of the earth's surface due to human activity"; for Brunhes it is "the science of the modalities of human activity on the surface of the earth." For Reclus place is the true and only object of geographical study; for Brunhes place is only the occasion or point of departure. Consequently Reclus does not encroach on the fields of the other sciences, while Brunhes creates sociology instead of geography. In tracing out the reciprocal influence of man and place or of historical events and geographical facts, Brunhes is dealing with human societies or groups, and therefore with social relations and facts or with the sociological aspect of such relations and facts. Wherever the 'Anthropogéographes' have been explicative, they have dealt with sociological facts; but, since they are not specialists in the latter field, the quality of their work has been poor. Any scientist who can utilize sociological data in the description of his own phenomena is welcome to them, but he should accept such data as authoritative and not attempt to transform or remake them. If the 'Anthropogéographes' wish to be merely geographers, they should accept the conceptions and procedure of Reclus and merely describe the earth's surface without encroaching on the domain of the sociologist; but if they wish to explain, to relate causes and effects, and formulate laws, they should become genuine sociologists and employ the accredited procedure and methods of sociology.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

The Work of Henri Poincaré. HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XI, 9, pp. 225-236.

In Poincaré were united such intensity of philosophic interest and scientific creativeness as have never before been united in one man, with the exception of Aristotle, and possibly Leibniz. His reflections on the nature and significance of scientific truth mediate between the rationalistic ideal of a static truth and a sceptical relativism. A new hypothesis must keep alive something of the old one it supersedes, for, though inadequate, the discarded hypothesis had some measure of real usefulness. Science always implies the organization of facts; and, while experiment is the path to knowledge, no mere collection of experiments constitutes a science. The purpose of our theories is not to describe things. Their durability lies in their power to simplify and unify the relations between things; their ephemeral aspect, in their descriptive implications. Mathematical facts expressed in Euclidean terminology can be translated into any non-Euclidean system; so that geometries are only languages, transcriptions of experience, and are not founded on arbitrary postulates. M. Poincaré believed that morality was founded on feelings; hence there could be neither a science of morals nor a conflict between science and morality. Finally, the value of science for him was not expressed in material achievement; science was not the mere servant of man, but 'the assertion of a cosmic law through which man becomes more finely moulded than the beasts.' Truth, not loved truths, succeed. 'Truth is eternal, though ideas perish, because ideas beget ideas, as men beget men.'

ANITA FREDERICA DE LAGUNA.

Ethical Pessimism in Bergson. J. W. SCOTT. Inter. J. of Ethics, XXIV, No. 2, pp. 147–167.

The aim of the paper is to point out the ethical pessimism in Bergson, and to question whether there is any reason for it in his account of the comic. Bergson's problem is what do we laugh at when we laugh? His idea is that the comical is the unadaptable and the unadaptable is the rigid. In pointing out the comic in life, he shows that so much of life is ridiculous, that the whole loses in ultimate value. The way to test the justice of the conclusion is to discover the moral view which underlies this conception of the comic. According to Bergson laughter is a means of securing moral conduct. Our question is whether such a means does not sacrifice some absolutely valuable aspects of life. Bergson points out correctly that the comical is the mechanical. But is it the mechanical aspect at which society laughs? What is comical is not the mechanical, but the mechanical movement of life. Bergson obscures the predominance of the human aspect—that the human aspect is the cause of the comical. The distinction between the comical and the moral is the presence of serious feelings in the latter. Such a statement is tautology. According to Bergson whenever life turns backwards, repeats itself or allows any of its elements to become transposable, it becomes comical provided the picture does not touch our feelings. The real effect of the serious and the comic is secured by the substitution of abrupt transitions for life's supposed fine gradations. The serious and the comic differ in degree as to the substitution. In the serious the substitution is not felt. For Bergson the comical presents abrupt transitions, the moral delicate gliding movements. But according to life is not the moral often abrupt and mechanical? To rule out the mechanical in the moral sphere is to rule out the only kind of morality we can possess. Such a procedure leads directly to a moral relativity. According to such a view the good is simply making delicate adjustments to varying circumstances. The moral imperative becomes, 'be adaptable'. We may sum up the position of this paper as follows. Bergson is correct in showing that the comical and the moral possess a common character. He fails to recognize the relative spheres of the comical and the moral, since he fails to see that this common character is a constituent of society's ideal.

C. M. HOBART.

Are Meanings Inherited? C. LLOYD MORGAN. Mind, XXIII, 90, pp. 169–179.

It is almost impossible to adduce examples of purely instinctive behavior, for there is so much instinctive warp and so much intelligent woof in all of our actions. The author examines the standpoint of Stout and MacDougall, who hold that meanings are inherited as well as acquired, and attempts to show that in most cases—if not in all—the inherited meanings are really the result of previous activity on the part of the individual. The establishment of associations is the work of intelligence. When associations have been formed, revival is made possible. That which is so revived is comprised under the head of (secondary) meaning, which raises the original presentation to the perceptual level. The reaction to these presentations will be different from the reaction to the original ones. If there is a difference between inherited and acquired meanings—if all are not of the latter kind—it is difficult to distinguish between them. The 'as ifs' in relation to instinctive behavior must not be interpreted as if they really were. The prevision of animals, in most cases, may be attributed to the intimate correlation between hereditary relatedness and relatedness to the environment. We must be careful not to attribute to animal behavior that which distinctly belongs to the mental life of human beings. At any rate, the question of inherited meanings has practically no bearing upon the interpretation of psychological problems.

HENRY BENTSON.

Psychic Function and Psychic Structure. HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. Mind, Vol. XXIII, pp. 180–193.

With regret the author sees the study of structural psychology give way to so-called functional psychology or the study of behavior. These studies of behavior are primarily biological and only incidentally psychological and involve teleological assumptions or implications which are foreign to strictly psychological manner of thought. Functional or 'process psychology' as well as structural must use the introspective method, and both are essential. The development of all science comes when attention is turned, not to the characteristics most easily discerned, but to searching out fundamental laws of which these characteristics are merely emphatic exemplifications. Consciousness is a psychic system rather than an elaborate combination of isolable psychic elements. The consciousness of a given moment corresponds in some manner with the activities in the same moment of some part at least of the individual's nervous system. All nerve substance—so long as it is alive—is active. These activities the author calls neururgic emphases, and they never stand alone, but each appears as part of what he calls a neururgic pattern. The activities of the whole nervous system are fundamentally of the same nature throughout. All parts of the correlated nerve system are reciprocally efficient. So consciousness is of the same fundamental nature throughout, and all parts of consciousness are reciprocally related. Diversities of psychic process are really diverse manifestations of one fundamental process. There is a receptive and a reacting nerve activity which corresponds to cognition and conation. Each neururgic emphasis and each neururgic pattern is *sui generis*, as is likewise each mental item and each psychic pattern. Each psychic emphasis shows some measure of complexity, of intensity, of agreeableness or disagreeableness, some degree of stability or realness, and some temporal qualification—five senses of relation. All of these must exist together in one moment in any psychic emphasis.

HENRY BENTSON.

A Definition of Causation. W. H. SHELDON. J. of Phil., Psy., and Sci. Meth., Vol. XI, No. 8, pp. 197–208.

This article is the first of a series which will deal with the subject of causation. The author points out the fact that although not much is said about this subject today, still in our transactions with reality—so far as reality is vouchsafed to mortals—the category of causality is inevitable and ubiquitous, because it deals with the connection of events. In order to arrive at a valid definition of causation the following method is proposed: take the analysis which science furnishes of each cause and of each effect, and of the process by which the one turns into the other; suppose this is accomplished for all kinds of cases which are treated in the various sciences; and suppose, finally, that we find common to all cases a certain logical structure. This structure will constitute an empirically grounded definition of causation. We must choose an empirical or concrete method and not the abstract or deductive. Causation, because of its own special nature, is internal to the particulars of the actual world. Even though our theory of causation is not actual but only ideal, it is an ever closer approximation to existing facts, and their detailed content depends more and more upon the nature of those facts. In the fields of science the cases of cause-effect must be selected according to the following rule: whenever a law is spoken of, or a principle, in accordance with which one actual fact, situation, or event uniquely determines another fact—or its own future state—then we have what science treats as causation. In tracing down the different sciences to see how many of them offer distinct types of causation, he concludes that only the field of physics need be examined. The total field of nature, so far as studied by physics, is comprised under the following divisions: mechanics, including static and dynamic, properties of matter such as elasticity, capillarity, density, etc., heat, sound, light and radiant energy, magnetism and electricity. To these fields we add those embodied in transformation of energy from one field to another, e. g. of electricity into light, of motion into heat or light, etc. Again he makes a synthesis and concludes that according to the present view of science, all cause-effect situations in nature are in the last analysis, and so far as there is general agreement, either mechanical cases, or cases determined by 'properties of matter', such as elasticity, friction, etc., or cases of electricity, or combinations of some or all of these.

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